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STATE OF UTAH, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
--0000000--
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
An information was filed against the defendants alleging a 
violation of Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-6-412, of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The significant portions of the 
information cited the language of Section 76-6-410(b) and read: 
"On or about the 18th day of June, 1979, at Utah County, 
State of Utah, Caral Lee Owens and Rudell Owens, at the time 
and place aforesaid, having custody of any property pursuant 
to a rental or lease agreement where it is to be returned in 
a specified manner or at a specified time, intentionally 
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement concerning 
returns so as to render such failure a gross deviation from 
the agreement, said property being of value in excess of 
$1,000." 
Defendants, through counsel, moved the Court to quash the 
information on the basis that the statutory language of Section 
76-6-410(b) and the charging language of the information were 
unconstitutionally vague, denying the defendants due process of 
law. 
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On April 4, 1980, Judge Allen B. Sorensen found that Section 
76-6-410(b) was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void and'' 
granted defendants' motion to quash. 
Appellant sought appeal from the ruling of unconstitution-
ality of Section 76-6-410(b)a 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to defendants' motion to quash the information on 
the basis that the charging statute, Section 76-6-410(b) was 
unconstitutionally vague and thereby denied defendants due process 
of law, the information was dismissed by order of the Court. The 
defendants were discharged and the State has sought appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY APPELLEE 
Dismissing the appeal upon the basis that the appeal is taken 
by Utah County Attorney's Office and, as such, is not a proper 
party to prosecute and pursue the appeal of criminal cases in the ~­
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Upholding the finding of the lower court that Section 76-6-
410 (b) and the language of such section as implemented through the 
information filed in the above matter is unconstitutionally vague. 
STATMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's recitation of facts are in conformance with 
respondents' understanding and with the statements contained in 
respondents' "Statement of the Nature of the Case". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO PURSUE AND 
PROSECUTE THIS APPEAL. 
The Utah County Attorney is a constitutional officer and is 
empowered to perform such duties as may be proscribed by law. 
State vs. Jiminez, Utah, 588 P.2d 707 (1978). 
The power and duties of the County Attorney are proscribed by 
the Legislature in Section 17-18-1, UCA, which provides in 
pertinent parts: 
"The County Attorney is a public prosecutor, and must: (1) 
conduct on behalf of the state all prosecutions for public 
offenses committed within this county •.. (3) ... the 
county attorney shall appear and prosecute for the state in 
the district court of his county in all criminal prosecutions 
and may appear in all civil cases in which the state may be 
interested and render such assistance as may be required by 
the attorney general and all such cases that may be appealed 
to the Supreme Court. . " 
The attorney general is a constitutional officer whose duties 
are also proscribed by law. State vs. Jiminez, supra. Section 
67-5-1, UCA, provides in pertinent parts, the role of the attorney 
general: 
"It is the duty of the attorney general: (1) to attend the 
supreme court of this state and all courts of the United 
States and prosecute or defend all causes to which the state . 
. • is a party. • . (5) to exercise supervisory powers over 
the . • • county attorneys of the state in all matters 
pertaining to the duties of their office. . . (7) when 
required by the public service or directed by the governor to 
assist in any o • county attorny in the discharge of his 
duties. 11 
This appeal is taken by the Utah County Attorney in the name 
of the State. The record does not disclose that the Utah County 
Attorney is rendering "such assistance as may be required by the 
attorney general in all such cases that may be appealed to the 
-3-
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supreme court." 
The appeal must be dismissed where the Utah County At-torney 
takes an appeal in the name of the State without the indication in 
the record that such appeal is pursued by the county attorney.as 
to render such assistance as may be required by the attorney 
general in a case that is appealed to the supreme court. 
State vs. Loddy, (Utah, September 29, 1980) 618 P.2d 60. 
POINT II 
THE CHARGING SECTION, UCA 76-6-410(b) IS SO VAGUE IN DEFINING 
THE PROHIBITIVE ACTS THAT IT DENIES THE DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
,-
The United States Supreme Court has long held that no one may·· 
be required at the peril of life, liberty, or property to 
specultate as to the meaning of penal statutes; all are entitled 
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids. 
Linzetta vs. New Jersey, 306 US 451, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939); 
Giaccio vs. Pennsylvania, 383 US 399, 86 S. Ct. 518. 
Thus, a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of~ 
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must ., 
necessarily guess as it's meaning and differ as to it's applicatioI ii 
violates the first essential madates of the due process clause. 
Connally vs. General Construction Company, 269 US 385, 46 S. Ct. 
() 
126 (1926); United States vs. Cardiff, 344 US 174 1 73 s. Ct. 180 
(1952). 
The reason for such requirements of statutory certainty are 
obvious and delineated by the Supreme Court in Grayned vs. City o_! :~ 
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Rockford, 408 US 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972): 
"Vague laws offend several important values. First, because 
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person .._:it 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be preventetr;" 
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them. A vague law impermissably delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on 
an ad hock sub·ective basis with the attended dan ers of 
ar itrary and discriminatory application. Third, but 
related, where a vague statute abutts upon sensitive areas of 
basic first amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the 
exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably 
lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... 
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked. 11 
In State vs. Musser, (Utah, 1950) 223 P.2d 193, the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that the statute must give adequate 
guidance to those who would be law abidding, to advise defendants 
of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to 
guide courts in trying those who are accused. 
In the present statute before the Court, a person is left to 
speculate as to the meaning of or what might constitute a gross 
deviation from an agreement. Further, such language as "gross 
deviation" irnpermissably delegates basic legislative policy 
matters to policemen , judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hock subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 
When a judge or jury is confronted with finding a gross 
deviation from a rental agreement, the opportunity to varying, 
subjective and unequal application of the law is present. One 
jury may find that a gross deviation may constitute one or two 
-5-
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days, while another might extend it over a period of months or 
even years before they would constitute any violation in the 
rental agreement to be a gross deviation. Allowing a jury to 
define the law by allowing them to determine what gross deviation 
means, would allow an unequal, arbitrary and discriminatory enforca 
of the statute. A defendant who appeals to the likings of the 
jury would surely be granted further extension on any agreement 
before the jury could conclude that there was a gross deviation of 
the rental contract; however, a different result could be applied 
where the individual is of a minority or of a personality to the 
disliking of the jury. 
Appellant has cited numerous cases where the Court has ruled 
with regard to some aspect of a statute somewhat resembling 
Section 76-6-410(b) of the Utah Code Annotated. In each case 1 
State vs. Craney, 381 A.2d 630 (ME 1978), State vs. Murgatory, 349 
A.2d 600 (NH 1975), People vs. Lafler, 393 NY.2d 484 (1977), People 
vs. Rici, 410 NY. Supp.2d, 619 (1978), and the Utah Court in State 
vs. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), State vs. Chavez, 605 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979), the Court has ruled upon some aspect of 
the case but has failed to confront the issue of whether the 
language of "gross deviation" is unconstitutionally vague. The 
case is a matter of first impression in the State of Utah and has 
not been ruled on in other states with the exception of the Court 
of Appeals of Oregon in State vs. Bovd, 28 Oregon. App. 725, 560 
P.2d 689. 
-6-
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In State vs. Boyd, the Oregon appelhte Court ~onfronted the 
following language: 
"Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircra[t pursuant to an 
agreement with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle, boat 
or aircraft is to be returned to the owner at a specified 
time, he knowingly retains or withholds possession thereof 
without consent of the owner for a so lengthy a period beyond 
the specified time as to render such retention and possession 
a gross deviation from the agreement." 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a 
five-word ruling: after reciting that the trial court held the 
statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court stated: "We find to 
the contrary.'' 
The Court cited State vs. Samter, 4 Oregon App. 349, 479 P.2d 
237 (1971) as supportive precedent. 
In State vs. Samter, the Court of Appeals of Oregon did not 
confront a statute or language reflecting the statute before the 
Court, particularly, "gross deviation." Defendants contend that 
the Oregon Court failed to de~l adequately with the issue of 
vagueness in it's five-word ruling. 
The Utah Court in various cases has found a statute's 
language void vagueness. In State vs. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 
P.2d 561 (1952), the section under attack was section 49-1-29 to 
32, UCA, 1943; the one with which the Court dealt chiefly concerned 
section 29 which provided as follows: 
"It is the duty of every person before commencing employment 
with any person, firm or corporation who the employees are 
out on labor strick, called by a national recognized union to 
register with the Industrial Commission of Utah." 
The defendant contended that the above language was vague and 
-7-
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uncertain. 
In holding that the statute was unconstitutional and void, 
the court held that the statute failed to inform persons of 
ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their 
conduct must be to conform to it's requirements and the statute 
failed to advise the defendant what constitutes the offense with 
which he was charged. Further, the court held that the statute 
was susceptible of different interpretation and application by 
those charged with responsibility of implying and enforcing it. 
The Packard court cited City of Price vs. Jaynes, 133 Utah 
89, 191 Po2d 606 wherein a city ordinance provided that: 
"The right. .. to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated." 
The Jaynes court held that such language was vague and 
uncertain~ 
In State vs. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193, the court 
held that the phrase "to commit any act injurious .•• to public 
morals" was unconstitutionally vague. 
Recently, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue before this 
Court in State vs. Bradshaw, (Utah 1975) 541 P.2d 800. In 
Bradshaw, the defendant was found guilty of violating section 76-
8-305, UCA, 1953, which read as follows: 
"A person is guilty of a class "B" misdemeanor when he 
intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law 
enforcement offical seeking to effect an arrest or detention 
of himself or another regardless of whether there is a legal 
basis for the .arrest." 
The Court held: 
-8-
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''':!-'he ~anguage of the particular statute v:e a~e here dealing 
with is undoubtedly subject to the constitutional challenge 
of vagueness. That part of the statute "'regardless of 
whether there is a legal basis for the arrest" may be subject 
to various meanings and interpretations. If the intention of 
the Legislature was to penalize a law abiding citizen by 
incarceration because he did not willing submit to an 
unlawful arrest, a statute authorizing the same is in 
violation of both Utah and the United States Constitution . 
. in that it permits and authorizes an arrest without 
probable cause and without lawful basis for the arrest. 
Likewise, the word "interfeers" as used in the statute 
without further definition or elaboration may mean any 
protest or verbal remonstration with an officer as well as 
the employment of physical force to avoid an arrest. We are 
of the opinion that the language of the statute as above 
pointed out fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is 
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be 
proscribed. The statute in the particulars above referred to 
is in violation of the constitution of this state and the 
United States and, therefore, invalid." 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the charging statute, particularly "gross 
deviation from the agreement" is unconstitutionally vague. It 
fails to give adequate warning to a person of ordinary 
intelligence to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act 
accordingly. Secondly, the statutes allows for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement by police officers and those in charge 
of prosecution of offenses. Finally, the law impermissably 
delegates basic policy matters within the sole discretion of the 
Legislature to policemen, judges and juries, for resolution on an 
ad hock subjective basis with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application to define what is a crime or not a 
crime. 
The County Attorney lacks the constitutional power to 
prosecute this appeal. 
-9-
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DATED this ~/]\th day of December, 1980. 
Attorne 
Rudell O ens 
Utah Cou y Legal Def enders 
107 East 100 South #29 
Provo, Utah 84601 
373-5510 x 440 
s 
Attorney for Defendant Car al Owens 
350 East Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
375-9801 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to the Utah County Attorney, 51 South University, Provo, Utah, 
84601, postage prepaid this day of December, 1980. 
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